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Abstract
Ridesharing and ridesourcing services have become widespread, and properly pricing rides is a crucial problem for
these services. We propose and analyze a budget-balanced and strategy-proof mechanism, the Weighted Minimum
Surplus (WMS) auction, for the dynamic ridesharing problem with multiple passengers per ride. We also propose
and analyze a budget-balanced version of the well-known VCG mechanism, the VCGs. Under the assumption of
downward closed alternatives, we obtain a lower bound for the surplus welfare and surplus profit of the WMS.
Finally, we present an exact algorithm based on integer linear programming to solve these auctions. Encouraging
experimental results of profit and welfare were obtained for both the WMS auction and the VCGs.
Keywords: Ridesharing; Ridesourcing; Auction
1. Introduction
The prevalence of smartphones equipped with internet connectivity and GPS systems have enabled the
rapid growth of platforms that allow a passenger to make a short-term request for the service of inde-
pendent drivers. When the driver’s motivation is to obtain a recurring income from these trips, such as in
the platforms Uber and Lyft, this is called ridesourcing (Rayle et al., 2014). This scenario can be distin-
guished from ridesharing, where the driver seeks to share their trip costs by serving passengers that have
a route similar to their own, as for example, in Waze Carpool (Waze Mobile, 2020) — a commercial
platform that facilitates ridesharing. Some ridesourcing platforms also seek sharing as a way to reduce
costs, for example, UberPool (Uber Technologies, 2020) and Lyft Line offer a smaller price by allowing
the trip to be shared among multiple passengers. The InDriver (InDriver, 2020) platform resembles an
auction since it allows passengers to advertise rides and prices, to which drivers can then give a coun-
teroffer. These services are part of a new type of economic interaction, called collaborative consumption
or sharing economy (Hamari et al., 2015).
Beyond the benefits for the participants of the trip, ridesharing is advantageous for the society as a
whole, as it may reduce the congestion and pollutant emission caused by the use of personal cars in
metropolitan areas by increasing the occupancy rate of vehicles and reducing the need for parking (Hahn
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and Metcalfe, 2017). As an example, the metropolitan area of Sa˜o Paulo, one of the largest in the world,
is in a long-lasting mobility crisis that was estimated to cost up to 1% of Brazilian GDP in 2012 (Cintra,
2014), with congestion resulting in up to three times more emission of pollutants than the expected
emission without congestion (Cintra, 2014).
In this paper, we propose pricing solutions that apply to both ridesharing and ridesourcing and uses
the term ridesharing to generalize both scenarios, except where the difference is explicitly noted. We are
particularly interested in dynamic ridesharing with trips that may be shared among multiple passengers,
which incurs lower costs for passengers and society. The Dynamic Ridesharing Problem, or real-
time ridesharing, is characterized in Agatz et al. (2012) by the following properties: Dynamic, the trips
must be formed rapidly as new requests come in continuously; Independent, drivers and passengers
are independent agents and therefore will only share a trip if that is beneficial to them; Cost sharing,
participants wish to obtain a lower cost than the one incurred by traveling alone; Non-recurring trips,
single short-term trips rather than recurring pre-arranged trips; Automatic, the system should require
minimal operational effort from the participants.
Dynamic ridesharing involves complex routing and pricing aspects. The Dial-A-Ride Prob-
lem (DARP), as defined in Cordeau (2006), is a good routing model for multi-passenger ridesharing,
where passengers have pick-up and drop-off locations that may not coincide with the driver’s initial lo-
cation and destination while also having constraints on pick up time and travel time. Routing problems
that have cost minimization as the objective have received much attention in the operations research lit-
erature (Pillac et al., 2013), for example, Santos and Xavier (2013) develop heuristics to maximize taxi
sharing in a DARP problem. The ridesharing problem with dynamic pricing brings new challenges such
as balancing the number of passengers served and the profit obtained.
Trip pricing gains importance in dynamic ridesharing because the independence of the agents makes it
necessary to incentivize the participation of passengers and, especially, drivers in the system. However,
pricing has received less attention from the ridesharing literature (Furuhata et al., 2013). In moments
of high demand, when there are few drivers and many passengers, it is necessary to raise prices to
attract drivers into the system and balance supply and demand. In this scenario cost minimization is
no longer the main goal of the system’s optimization since the valuation of each passenger for the trip
must be considered. Some ridesourcing platforms such as Uber and Lyft raise the price per distance in
these scenarios, a policy known as surge pricing. Current studies suggest that surge pricing achieves its
goals of improving economic efficiency (Hahn and Metcalfe, 2017). Still, surge pricing has been viewed
negatively by consumers and regulators (Cachon et al., 2017). When the system decides for a higher
price consumers might perceive that it is acting against them. In an auction however the consumers’ bids
would determine the price, so we explore auctions as a form of balancing the market in moments of high
demand with a price that is better justifiable to the consumer.
1.1. Literature Review
Two desirable properties of auctions that are studied in auction-based pricing for ridesharing literature
are budget-balance, which means the price paid by users is at least the driver’s cost for serving them, and
strategy-proofness, which means participants do not gain by misreporting their valuations to manipulate
the auction.
Kamar and Horvitz (2009) propose a multi-driver system based on a Vickrey-Clark-Groves
(VCG) (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) auction. The VCG auction is not budget-balanced
and, due to the use of heuristics for better computational performance, is implemented in a way that
also is not strategy-proof. Kleiner et al. (2011) uses a strategy-proof auction adapted from the second-
price auction (Vickrey, 1961) where each driver may serve a single passenger. Considering each driver
in isolation, this auction is strategy-proof and budget-balanced, as long as the driver is not allowed to
choose the served passenger. Our work extends this line of research by proposing mechanisms that are
multi-passenger, strategy-proof, and budget-balanced.
Another line of research involves making prior assumptions on the passenger’s arrival rate and valua-
tion distributions and then calculating prices that are optimal in expectation. Sayarshad and Chow (2015)
and Chen et al. (2017) explore this type of mechanism while Masoud et al. (2017) assumes a prior dis-
tribution on the passengers’ valuations to propose an optimal price for which a passenger may buy a trip
from another passenger.
In recent literature, Zhao et al. (2014) propose a multi-driver and multi-passenger theoretical model
that uses a VCG auction with reserve prices, but they achieve budget-balance only when the drivers
make no detours, while the auctions we propose are budget-balanced even with detours. Zhang et al.
(2016) apply a bilateral trade reduction mechanism that is strategy-proof, modifying the McAfee mech-
anism (McAfee, 1992) for a ridesourcing scenario. A limitation of this mechanism is that a driver may
only serve one passenger at a time, and budget-balance is not guaranteed. Shen et al. (2018) propose
an online ridesharing system where a passenger that enters the system is offered a price estimate to be
served by an available driver, assuming a scenario where the driver supply is sufficient for passengers
to be immediately served. The authors claim that the system is strategy-proof however the final price
may be lower than the accepted estimate, so the passenger may strategically accept a higher estimate
hoping to get a lower final price. This system is in fact individually rational, that is, it guarantees that a
passenger that only accepts estimates lower or equal to their valuation will not suffer a loss.
A comprehensive survey by Furuhata et al. (2013) classifies ridesharing as either for a single passenger
or multiple passengers. It also describes four spatial patterns of increasing generality, of which the most
general is detour ridesharing, where the driver may take detours and passenger pick-up locations do not
have to coincide with the driver’s start location and neither do passenger delivery locations have to co-
incide with the driver’s destination. This survey also identifies challenges for auction-based ridesharing,
among them to find a mechanism that is strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and allows multiple passengers
to be served. Even in recent literature this challenge still has not been addressed.
1.2. Our contribution
In this paper, we propose auction mechanisms for single-driver, multi-passenger, detour ridesharing
that are strategy-proof and budget-balanced. The main proposed auction is the Weighted Minimum Sur-
plus (WMS) auction, for which we obtain a lower bound of the maximum social welfare and profit under
certain conditions. We also propose VCGs, a budget-balanced version of the VCG auction which remains
strategy-proof.
We present an experimental analysis of all proposed auctions, utilizing ridesharing instances generated
on real-world maps. Both the WMS and the VCGs obtain high social welfare and achieve good profit,
particularly in instances with a larger number of passengers. Though these mechanisms were analyzed
only in single-driver scenarios, they may serve as a basis for generalization to multi-driver scenarios,
which appears to be a much harder problem.
2. Auction-based dynamic ridesharing
In the Auction-Based Dynamic Ridesharing Problem with a Single Driver and Multiple Passengers
a driver with a specific destination wishes to share their trip with passengers in exchange for mone-
tary gain. Each passenger wishes to be served, that is, transported from their pick-up location to their
drop-off location. To solve the problem using an auction, the system requests each passenger i to bid
a non-negative value bi for being served. The passengers have maximum pick-up time and travel time
constraints. In a ridesharing scenario, the driver may have a constraint on the maximum arrival time at
the destination. We focus on the single-driver problem as a step towards a generalization for the multi-
driver problem.
A trip A consists of a route that begins at the driver’s current location, serves a set of passengers, and
finishes at the driver’s destination, respecting all time constraints. A trip A is represented simply by a set
of served passengers, that is, i ∈ A if and only if i is served by trip A. The value cost(A) is the cost for
the driver to serve A, representing costs such as fuel and time. We consider that the distances between
locations form a metric, and therefore the triangle inequality is valid. The system must determine the
winning trip A∗ to be served by the driver and the price pi to be charged from each passenger. Let I be
the set of all passengers, then the total value collected will be
∑
i∈I pi (noting that, in our auctions, pi = 0
if i < A∗).
An auction is a suitable way to solve this problem when there is a high demand since the price will
rise along with the bids as an incentive for drivers to join the system. Since there are multiple desirable
properties for an auction studied in Auction Theory, we focus on four properties to evaluate auction
mechanisms for this problem: Being strategy-proof, maximizing social welfare, being budget-balanced
and maximizing profit. The remainder of this section defines these properties.
The passenger’s bid bi may not be equal to their private valuation vi for the ride. Strategy-proofness
means that a passenger can maximize their gain by bidding vi. Therefore, a single passenger cannot
manipulate the auction to their advantage by lying their true valuation for being served. Since we restrict
our attention to auctions that are strategy-proof we refer to bi or vi interchangeably.
Let A be set of trips, or alternatives, from which the winning trip A∗ ∈ A is chosen. The social
welfare of an alternative is the valuation of the served passengers minus the cost for the driver, that
is, V(A) =
∑
i∈A vi − cost(A). An auction maximizes social welfare if V(A∗) = max{V(A)|A ∈ A}. Budget-
balance is achieved when the total price paid is at least the cost for the driver, that is,
∑
i∈I pi ≥ cost(A∗)
and the driver never suffers a loss from serving the passengers. Profit is an important goal both for
drivers and for the organization running the system and is defined as profit(A∗) =
∑
i∈I pi − cost(A∗). To
maximize profit is to maximize the surplus payment after paying the driver cost. In the next section, we
propose an auction that is strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and achieves good social welfare and profit
in experimental results.
3. Weighted Minimum Surplus auction
In this section, we propose the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction for a single-driver, multiple
passenger setting which models the situation where a driver enters a system where they are the only
driver available to multiple waiting passengers. We prove this auction to be budget-balanced, which is
desirable to the driver as they will never lose money from a trip, and strategy-proof which is desirable to
the passenger who can maximize their gain simply by bidding the true valuation vi, instead of strategizing
to improve their gain.
3.1. Winning trip and price
For the auction to be budget-balanced it must be ensured that the cost of the winning trip will be covered
by the prices paid. To achieve this, from the valuation vi of each passenger i, the passenger cost ci is
reserved to pay part of the cost of the driver if i is served. The exact way to determine ci is a choice to be
made by the auction designer. For strategy-proofness to hold it is required that ci does not depend on vi
nor on the choice of winning trip. For example ci can be the cost of going from passenger’s i pick-up
location to their drop-off location.
The surplus si = vi−ci of passenger i is the difference between the passenger’s bid and the passenger’s
cost. Only passengers with si ≥ 0 can be served by the auction since, otherwise, their valuation would
not be sufficient to cover their cost.
A trip A will be considered feasible if si ≥ 0 for all i ∈ A and the passenger costs are sufficient to
cover the cost of the trip, that is
∑
i∈A ci ≥ cost(A). The set of alternativesA for the auction (from which
the winning trip A∗ is chosen) is composed only of feasible trips.
Let the minimum surplus of a trip A be defined as smin(A) = mini∈A si, then the weighted min-
imum surplus of A is wm(A) = |A|smin(A). The winning trip A∗ is given by the allocation func-
tion A∗ = arg max wm(A) where A ∈ A. Ties are broken by some criteria that does not depend on
bids.
To define pi, first we must define the value wm∗−i and the alternative A
′
i . Given a passenger i
let wm∗−i = max{max{wm(A)|A ∈ A, i < A}, 0}. If i ∈ A∗, then A′i is simply the trip A of maximum car-
dinality such that i ∈ A and wm(A) ≥ wm∗−i. In general, A′i is defined for any i as the set of maximum
cardinality among the sets A ∈ A such that i ∈ A, |A| > 1 and
wm∗−i ≤ |A|smin(A \ {i}). (1)
In case of an equality in Equation (1), A′i must also be such that it wins a tie against any A for
which wm∗−i = wm(A). If no such A
′
i that fulfills all the requirements exists, then if {i} ∈ A let A′i = {i}.
Given wm∗−i and A
′
i , the price paid by i is defined as
pi = ci +
wm∗−i
|A′i |
, (2)
if i ∈ A∗, and pi = 0 otherwise. By Lemma 1, if i ∈ A∗, then A′i exists and pi is well-defined. The term ci
is used to pay the driver’s cost cost(A∗) while the value of the second term may be considered entirely
as profit to be shared between the driver and the organization that manages the system.
Lemma 1. If there is vi ∈ R such that i ∈ A∗ for some vi, then A′i exists.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive: If there is no A′i then i < A
∗ for any vi. By definition, we have that A′i
does not exist if and only if {i} < A and for all A ∈ A
i ∈ A =⇒ wm∗−i > |A|smin(A \ {i}). (3)
We must show that this implies i < A∗. Considering more elements cannot increase the minimum surplus
of a set, so from (3), we have wm∗−i > wm(A) for all A with i ∈ A. Since A∗ is the winner we know
that wm(A∗) ≥ wm∗−i. Joining the inequalities, we have that wm(A∗) > wm(A) for any A such that i ∈ A,
from where we conclude that i < A∗. 
The price in Equation (2) is defined so that it is a threshold for vi. If vi is above the threshold then i
wins and pays that threshold, otherwise i does not win and pays nothing. This is called the critical value
which is analogous to the second-price in a Vickrey auction. This will be a crucial point in the proof that
the mechanism is strategy-proof, which is given in Section 3.2.
3.2. Example
Here we illustrate an instance of the Weighted Minimum Surplus auction. The input graph is presented
in Figure 1 and consists of a driver with a start and end position and four passengers. The trips with
highlighted paths are R = {1, 2} in red, G = {1, 3, 4} in green, B = {1} in blue and Y = {2} in yellow with
multiple arrows between two nodes indicating an edge being used by multiple highlighted trips. Table 1
shows the input bids, passenger costs and trip costs. We can verify that these four trips are feasible
since
∑
i∈A ci ≥ cost(A) for all of R, B, G and Y . Other feasible trips are omitted because they do not
affect the outcome of the auction, so without loss of generality, the set of alternatives isA = {R,G, B,Y}.
The winning trip is A∗ = R since R = arg max wm(A) for A ∈ A. Thus, passengers 1 and 2 are served,
and their price must be determined. First, we calculate p1 which depends on wm∗−1 and A
′
1. Since Y is the
only alternative that does not contain 1, trivially wm∗−1 = wm(Y). By definition A
′
1 is trip of maximum
cardinality such that 1 ∈ A and wm(A) ≥ wm∗−1. Therefore, A′1 = G and p1 = c1 + wm(Y)|G| = 4 + 83 . For p2,
we need do compute wm∗−2 and A
′
2. The second-highest weighted minimum surplus is that of G and 2 < G,
therefore wm∗−2 = wm(G). The only trip such that 2 ∈ A and wm(A) ≥ wm(G) is R itself, therefore A′2 = R.
Finally we have p2 = c2+
wm(G)
|R| = 10. In this example it is interesting to note that even though passenger 1
had a higher bid than passenger 2 and both had the same cost, the price p2 was higher.
3.3. Strategy-proofness
In this section, we build theoretical results that are then used in Theorem 8 to show that the WMS auction
is strategy-proof.
Table 1: Inputs to the example
(a) Passenger bid, cost and surplus
Passenger bi ci si = bi − ci
1 14 4 10
2 12 4 8
3 8 4 4
4 10 6 4
(b) Trip cost, size and weighted minimum surplus
Trip Passengers cost(A) |A| smin(A) wm(A)
R {1, 2} 5 2 8 16
G {1, 3, 4} 7 3 4 12
B {1} 3 1 10 10
Y {2} 3 1 8 8
Fig. 1: Nodes and edges of example instance. All edges have unit cost.
The objective of a participant in the auction is to maximize their utility. For a served passenger i ∈ A∗
the utility is ui = vi − pi, the private valuation vi for the trip minus the price paid pi. The utility of
passenger i if i < A∗ is ui = 0 since pi = 0 and there is no value in not being served. A rational passenger
will choose a bid bi such that the utility is maximized. An auction is strategy-proof when making bi = vi
always maximizes the utility of a passenger.
We see that in the WMS auction the passenger expresses the private valuation in a single value vi for
winning since the valuation for losing is always zero. So we may say the WMS auction has a single-
parameter domain. For discussion on mechanisms with a single-parameter domain see Nisan (2007).
The critical value criti(v−i), given a vector of valuations v−i by other passengers and an allocation
function A∗, is such that for any vi if criti(v−i) < vi then i ∈ A∗ and if vi < criti(v−i) then i < A∗. An
allocation function A∗ is allocation monotone if a passenger that wins when reporting a valuation vi
also wins when reporting any higher valuation, considering that A and all other bids are held constant.
Therefore a passenger cannot go from winning to losing by raising their bid.
To show strategy-proofness, we use the characterization stated in Theorem 2. Proof of this characteri-
zation can be found in Theorem 9.36 of Nisan (2007).
Theorem 2 (Characterization of strategy-proofness for single-parameter domains). An auction for single-
parameter domains is strategy-proof if: A∗ is allocation monotone; pi = criti(v−i) if i ∈ A∗; pi = 0 if
i < A∗; and if i ∈ A for all A ∈ A, then pi is a constant independent from the valuations.
To show that the WMS auction satisfies the conditions for the characterization, first we prove that the
allocation function is monotone.
Lemma 3. A∗ = arg max wm(A) is allocation monotone.
Proof. Let i be such that i ∈ A∗ and let wm′(A) = |A|min j∈A s′j denote the weighted minimum surplus of
an alternative A when i has a valuation v′i ≥ vi and j , i retains their valuation (v′j = v j). We must show
that i ∈ arg max wm′(A).
Notice that the minimum surplus of alternatives containing i may have increased. Thus,
wm′(A) ≥ wm(A) if i ∈ A, and wm′(A) = wm(A) otherwise. Since A∗ wins in the original valuation,
for all A such that i < A we have wm(A∗) ≥ wm(A). Also, since i ∈ A∗ we have wm′(A∗) ≥ wm(A∗).
In conclusion wm′(A∗) is greater or equal to any wm′(A) such that i < A. Assuming that tie breaks are
independent of valuations, we have i ∈ arg max wm′(A) and the result follows. 
We now prove that pi = criti(v−i) for i ∈ A∗ in the weighted minimum surplus mechanism and,
therefore, winners pay the critical value. By equation (2), for i ∈ A∗, we define pi = ci + wm
∗
−i
|A′i | , so we must
show that this is, in fact, the critical value. First, in Lemma 4 we show an intermediary result.
Lemma 4. Let i be such that A′i exists. For any A ∈ A such that i ∈ A and wm(A) ≥ wm∗−i, it is true
that |A| ≤ |A′i |.
Proof. If A = {i} the result is trivial. Otherwise, by wm(A) ≤ |A|smin(A \ {i}) and the hypothesis, we
have wm∗−i ≤ |A|smin(A \ {i}), so by the definition of A′i in Equation (1), we get |A| ≤ |A′i |. 
The next result will be used in Lemma 5 for the first part of the critical value proof. It shows that if a
winning passenger i lowers their bid below pi, then they will no longer win.
Lemma 5. Let i be such that A′i exists. For all vi ∈ R such that vi < ci + wm
∗
−i
|A′i | , we have that i < A
∗.
Proof. Assume the existence of a trip B such that i ∈ B and wm∗−i ≤ wm(B). Since i ∈ B,
we have smin(B) ≤ si. By Lemma 4 we also have |B| ≤ |A′i |. Combining these two facts we
get |B|smin(B) ≤ si|A′i | and, applying the hypothesis vi − ci < wm
∗
−i
|A′i | , we reach that wm(B) < wm
∗
−i, which is
a contradiction. Therefore such B cannot exist and any alternative containing i loses to the alternative of
weighted minimum surplus wm∗−i, so i cannot win if vi < ci +
wm∗−i
|A′i | . 
The second part of the critical value proof is in Lemma 6. One of its consequences is that if a losing
passenger raises their bid above the price they would pay when wining, then they will, in fact, be in the
new winning alternative.
Lemma 6. Let i be such that A′i exists. For all vi ∈ R, if ci + wm
∗
−i
|A′i | < vi, then i ∈ A
∗.
Proof. We must show that if wm∗−i < si|A′i |, then i ∈ arg max wm(A). Since i ∈ A′i and A′i , by defini-
tion, wins in a tie against any alternative of value wm∗−i, it is sufficient to show that wm
∗
−i ≤ wm(A′i),
since wm∗−i is the value of the best alternative that does not contain i. If si = smin(A
′
i), then using the hy-
pothesis that wm∗−i < si|A′i | we conclude that wm∗−i < wm(A′i). Otherwise, if si , smin(A′i) then we know
that A′i , {i} and smin(A′i \ {i}) = smin(A′i). So, by Equation (1), we have wm∗−i ≤ wm(A′i). In both cases A′i
is better than any alternative with value wm∗−i which is the value of the best alternative without i. From
where we conclude that i ∈ A∗. 
Combining the lemmas above we show that the value of pi when i ∈ A∗ is, indeed, the critical value,
the threshold value above which i is winning and below which i is losing.
Lemma 7. Let i be such that A′i exists. The critical value for i is criti(v−i) = ci +
wm∗−i
|A′i | .
Proof. By hypothesis A′i exists, so from Lemmas 5 and 6 we have that for any vi if ci +
wm∗−i
|A′i | < vi
then i ∈ A∗ and if vi < ci + wm
∗
−i
|A′i | then i < A
∗. Therefore criti(v−i) = ci +
wm∗−i
|A′i | is the critical value
for A∗ = arg max wm(A). 
Finally, we can satisfy the characterization by showing that the auction is allocation monotone and also
charges the critical value from winners. In Theorem 8 we reach the key property of strategy-proofness.
Theorem 8. The WMS auction is strategy-proof.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that A∗ = arg max wm(A), as defined for the WMS auction, is allocation
monotone. By Lemma 7 and equation (2), if i ∈ A∗ and A′i exists, then the auction charges the critical
value from winners. If A′i does not exist, then by Lemma 1 for any vi we have i < A
∗. By the definition
of pi if i < A∗, then pi = 0. Therefore the WMS auction satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 and, thus,
is strategy-proof. 
Before discussing the budget-balanced property, which is the other major property of the WMS auc-
tion, we define a simplified variant of the WMS auction. We show a class of instances for which the main
definition is theoretically superior. This justifies the intuition that taking the cardinality of the alternatives
into account should give better results, even though it leads to a more complicated pricing scheme.
3.4. Unweighted minimum surplus auction
The unweighted minimum surplus auction is a variant in which the minimum surplus smin(A) is used
directly to determine the winner rather than |A|smin(A) which is used in the weighted minimum surplus
auction.
For the unweighted variant the winner is A′∗ = arg max smin(A) where A ∈ A. Given the second
minimum surplus of i as ss′i = max{max{smin(A) | A ∈ A, i < A}, 0}, the price for passenger i is sim-
ply p′i = ci + ss
′
i if i ∈ A∗ and pi = 0 otherwise. The following result shows that in many cases this
unweighted variant of the auction cannot achieve a better surplus payment than the original weighted
auction. The surplus payment of A according to p, denoted by sp(A, p), is the amount paid by the pas-
sengers discounting the cost, that is, sp(A, p) =
∑
i∈A(pi − ci). This surplus payment is meaningful as a
lower bound on the profit which is profit(A) =
∑
i∈A pi − cost(A), since ∑i∈A ci ≥ cost(A) in a feasible
alternative.
Theorem 9. Let A be a set of alternatives and let A∗ and p be the winning trip and price charged in
the weighted variant, respectively. Also, let A′∗ and p′ be the winning trip and price charged in the
unweighted variant, respectively. If A∗∩A′∗ = ∅ and |A′i | ≤ |A∗| for all i ∈ A∗, then sp(A∗, p) ≥ sp(A′∗, p′).
Proof. By hypothesis, if i ∈ A∗, then i < A′∗ and, thus, wm∗−i ≥ |A′∗|smin(A′∗). From these two facts we
have that
sp(A∗, p) ≥
∑
i∈A∗
|A′∗|smin(A′∗)
|A′i |
.
Since we assume |A′i | ≤ |A∗| for all i ∈ A∗, we may simplify to sp(A∗, p) ≥ |A′∗|smin(A′∗) by observing
that the dividend |A′∗|smin(A′∗) does not depend on i, and that ∑i∈A∗ 1|A′i | ≥ 1.
In the unweighted variant the surplus payment is sp(A′∗, p′) =
∑
i∈A∗ ss′i . Thus, since smin(A
′∗) ≥ ss′i
for all i ∈ A′∗ we have |A′∗|smin(A′∗) ≥ sp(A′∗, p′). Joining the two inequalities we conclude
that sp(A∗, p) ≥ sp(A′∗, p′). 
4. Budget-balance and passenger cost
For a driver to be willing to participate in the system, the price of the trip should at least cover the cost
to serve the winning trip. The exact cost for a driver to serve a trip is difficult to model since the costs
perceived by the driver may have complex social and psychological aspects (Lee et al., 2015). We note
that time and fuel costs are different between ridesourcing and ridesharing scenarios. In ridesourcing, the
driver does not have a fixed destination and therefore expects the cost of the entire route to be covered.
While in ridesharing it is sufficient for the driver to achieve a lower cost than the one they would have
by traveling alone.
An auction is budget-balanced if
∑
i∈I pi ≥ cost(A∗), meaning that the price paid by the passengers is
sufficient to cover the cost of the driver. The next theorem proves the budget-balanced property for the
WMS auction.
Theorem 10. The WMS auction is budget-balanced, that is,
∑
i∈I pi ≥ cost(A∗).
Proof. Since pi = 0 for i < A∗, we have
∑
i∈I pi =
∑
i∈A∗ pi. Substituting the definition of pi, we
have
∑
i∈A∗ pi =
∑
i∈A∗(ci +
wm∗−i
|A′∗ | ). Since wm
∗
−i ≥ 0, we get that
∑
i∈A∗(ci +
wm∗−i
|A′∗ | ) ≥
∑
i∈A∗ ci, and, as A∗
is a feasible alternative,
∑
i∈A∗ ci ≥ cost(A∗). In conclusion ∑i∈A∗ pi ≥ cost(A∗), so the total payment by
passengers is greater or equal to the driver’s cost. 
A very similar proof can be made to show that the unweighted minimum surplus auction is also
budget-balanced.
4.1. Setting the cost
Theorem 10 shows how the passenger cost guarantees that the price paid by the passengers covers the
driver’s cost. This section explores some ways in which the cost ci of passenger i can be defined. First,
we determine the requirements on ci and, then, present formulations of ci that respect those requirements.
The property of strategy-proofness requires that ci does not depend on the bid bi, as otherwise i could
directly manipulate the price. A more subtle requirement is that ci must be the same in all feasible
alternatives, which we prove next.
Theorem 11. Let ci(A) be the cost of i in alternative A. If there are two feasible alternatives A′ and A′′
such that i ∈ A′ and i ∈ A′′ but ci(A′) , ci(A′′), then the WMS auction is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Let there be an instance with two passengers 1 and 2,
such that the feasible alternatives are A = {A′, A′′} where A′ = {1, 2} and A′′ = {1} are trips such
that c1(A′) > c1(A′′). Let s1(A) be the surplus of passenger 1 in trip A, then s1(A′′) > s1(A′). Note that
since 1 is in all feasible alternatives, ss1 = 0 and the price of 1 is p1 = c1(A∗). Therefore, p1 is minimized
(and the utility u1 is maximized) when A∗ = A′′. Also assume that, in this instance, when the passengers
are truthful wm(A′) > wm(A′′) and, therefore, A∗ = A′. Since s1(A′′) > s1(A′) passenger 1 may increase
their utility by lowering their bid until s1(A′) = 0, making wm(A′) = 0 and, therefore, switching the
winner to A∗ = A′′. Since the optimal strategy of passenger 1 is not to be truthful, the auction is not
strategy-proof. 
In light of Theorem 11, we wish to define ci without depending on the trip. For example, even an equal
split of the cost ci(A) =
cost(A)
|A| would not be strategy-proof. We propose two definitions that achieve our
goals, the direct cost and the upper bound cost.
The direct cost defines ci = di where di is the distance between the pick-up and drop-off location of
passenger i. This definition of cost makes the restriction that vi ≥ di be a necessary condition for i to be in
a feasible alternative. Nonetheless, it is not sufficient for an alternative to be feasible, since we still require
that
∑
i∈A ci ≥ cost(A). Also, notice that, for any feasible alternative A, we have∑i∈A di ≥ cost(A), which
is the interesting property that any feasible alternative will result in a global cost saving in comparison
to each passenger going from their pick-up to drop-off point by themselves.
The upper bound cost defines ci = ri where ri is the round trip cost of passenger i. The round trip
cost ri is the minimum cost for the driver to go from their starting location (or destination) to pick-up
and, then, drop-off passenger i and then return to their starting location (or destination). Recalling that
the distances respect the triangle inequality,
∑
i∈P ri ≥ cost(A) is satisfied for any A because the cost of
making all the round trips in a sequence is an upper bound to the optimal cost of the trip. Thus, this
definition of cost makes the restriction that vi ≥ ri for all i ∈ A be necessary and sufficient for A to be a
feasible alternative.
Having explored some concrete definitions for the cost, we will propose a budget-balanced variant of
the VCG auction that leverages this same concept of cost.
5. VCG and surplus welfare
The social welfare, which is the combined economic gains and losses for all participants, is commonly
used to measure the economic efficiency of an auction. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) (Vickrey,
1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) mechanism is a widely studied general method to obtain a strategy-
proof auction that maximizes social welfare.
For the ridesharing problem, there are at least two ways we can define the social welfare of a trip. If
the welfare of the driver is not considered, it is simply V(A) =
∑
i∈A vi. If we consider the driver to be a
participant with value −cost(A), taking into account the social impact of longer trips, then the welfare is
defined as V(A) =
∑
i∈A vi−cost(A). This choice does not impact the theoretical properties of the auction.
Given a definition for V(A), let V−i(A) = V(A)− vi if i ∈ A and V−i(A) = V(A) otherwise. We then obtain
a VCG mechanism, using Clarke’s pivot rule, by defining the winner as A∗ = arg maxA∈A V(A) and the
price for i as pi = maxA∈A{V−i(A)} − V−i(A∗). The economic interpretation is that i is being charged their
externality or the welfare they take away from the rest of the society by participating.
By the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983), it is generally impossi-
ble to construct a strategy-proof mechanism that simultaneously is budget-balanced and maximizes so-
cial welfare. The VCG mechanism is strategy-proof and maximizes social welfare by definition, there-
fore it is not budget-balanced. We consider budget-balance to be a crucial requirement to incentivize
drivers in the ridesharing problem, so we use surplus welfare as a measure of welfare that is suitable for
budget-balanced auctions that use a passenger cost. The surplus welfare of an alternative A is defined
as Vs(A) =
∑
i∈A vi −∑i∈A ci or, equivalently, Vs(A) = ∑i∈A si. The surplus welfare of an auction is that
of the winning trip Vs(A∗).
We now propose the VCGs auction which maximizes the surplus welfare instead of the social welfare
and achieves budget-balance. As in the WMS auction, we restrict the set of feasible alternatives A, in
such a way that, for all A ∈ A we have ∑i∈A ci ≥ cost(A∗) and vi ≥ ci for all i ∈ A. Since the sum
of passenger costs is always greater or equal to the real cost, conversely surplus welfare will always
be less or equal to real social welfare. So the nearer the passenger costs are to the real cost, the nearer
surplus welfare will be to real welfare. The winner and price definitions are the same as the ones for the
VCG auction, but with the surplus welfare in place of the real welfare and the surplus in the place of the
bid. The winner is A∗ = arg maxA∈A Vs(A) and the price is pi = ci + maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} − ∑ j∈A∗,i, j s j
for i ∈ A∗, and pi = 0 for i < A∗. We now demonstrate strategy-proofness and budget-balance for this
auction.
By observing that the VCGs auction has a single-parameter domain, we may use the characterization
of strategy-proofness stated in Section 3.2. The first step for the characterization is to show that A∗ is
monotone with respect to the valuation.
Lemma 12. A∗ = arg maxA∈A Vs(A) is allocation monotone.
Proof. Consider i such that i ∈ A∗ in the original valuations. If i increased their valuation to v′i ≥ vi while
any other j such that j , i keeps v′j = v j, then let V
′
s(A) be the surplus welfare of an alternative A.
If i < A, then V ′s(A) = Vs(A), and if i ∈ A then V ′s(A) = Vs(A) + (v′i − vi), so V ′s(A) ≥ Vs(A). We may
conclude that i ∈ A∗ implies that i ∈ arg maxA∈A V ′s(A), therefore A∗ is allocation monotone. This is
intuitive since i was in the original alternative of maximum surplus welfare A∗ and only alternatives that
contain i increased in surplus welfare (by the same amount since ci is constant), so i must remain in the
alternative of maximum surplus welfare. 
Recalling that the critical value criti(v−i) must be such that if vi > criti(v−i) then i ∈ A∗ and
if vi < criti(v−i) then i < A∗, we show that the critical value for the VCGs auction is
criti(v−i) = ci + max
A∈A
 ∑j∈A,i, j s j
 − maxA∈A,i∈A
 ∑j∈A,i, j s j
 . (4)
To prove the critical value in Lemma 13, we show that a lower valuation cannot win and then in
Lemma 14 that a higher valuation always wins.
Lemma 13. For any vi, we have that vi < ci + maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} − maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} implies
that i < A∗.
Proof. If si < 0 then no alternative containing i is feasible and trivially i < A∗, so we assume si ≥ 0. By
the hypothesis si < maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} −maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j}, and by the assumption that si ≥ 0, we
may loosen the inequality to si + maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} < maxA∈A{∑ j∈A s j} which simplifies to
max
A∈A,i∈A
∑j∈A s j
 < maxA∈A
∑j∈A s j
. (5)
By definition, we have A∗ = arg maxA∈A
∑
j∈A s j, so i ∈ A∗ would imply that
max
A∈A,i∈A
∑j∈A s j
 = maxA∈A
∑j∈A s j
. (6)
We see that (6) would contradict what we have proven in (5) so it must be that i < A∗. 
Lemma 14. If vi > ci + maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} −maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j}, then i ∈ A∗.
Proof. The hypothesis may be arranged as maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A s j} > maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j}, which we
may loosen to maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A s j} > maxA∈A,i<A{∑ j∈A s j}. Since A∗ = arg maxA∈A∑ j∈A s j it must be
that i ∈ A∗. 
The allocation function is monotone and we have shown that criti(v−i) is the critical value. So the
characterization can be fulfilled as we see next.
Theorem 15. The VCGs auction is strategy-proof.
Proof. Lemma 12 shows that the allocation function is monotone and Lemmas 13 and 14 show
that criti(v−i) as defined in Equation 4 is the critical value. The final part of the characterization
is to show that for i ∈ A∗ the critical value is paid, that is, pi = criti(v−i). From the definitions,
it is immediate that pi = criti(v−i) if and only if
∑
j∈A∗,i, j s j = maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j}. Knowing
that i ∈ A∗ and A∗ = arg maxA∈A∑ j∈A s j, we have ∑ j∈A∗ s j = maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A s j}, subtracting si we
reach that
∑
j∈A∗,i, j s j = maxA∈A,i∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j}. Therefore pi = criti(v−i), concluding the proof by the
previously mentioned characterization of strategy-proofness in Theorem 2. 
Having shown strategy-proofness for the VCGs, the desired budget-balance property for this auction
is shown next with a simple proof.
Theorem 16. The VCGs is budget-balanced, that is,
∑
i∈I pi ≥ cost(A∗).
Proof. Since A∗ ∈ A we have maxA∈A{∑ j∈A,i, j s j} ≥ ∑ j∈A∗,i, j s j, by combining this inequality with the
definition of pi, we conclude that pi ≥ ci for i ∈ A∗. So ∑i∈A∗ pi ≥ cost(A∗) and, since pi = 0 for i < A∗,
we have
∑
i∈I pi ≥ cost(A∗). 
6. Surplus Welfare and Surplus Profit in WMS
In what follows, we present lower bounds on the surplus welfare and the surplus profit obtained by the
WMS auction.
6.1. Lower bound on the surplus welfare
Given a family of alternatives A, we define the surplus welfare ratio of an auction as the ratio between
the maximum surplus welfare and the obtained surplus welfare:
maxA∈A{Vs(A)}
Vs(A∗)
,
where A∗ is the winning alternative amongA. The VCGs auction, by definition, has a welfare ratio of 1
for any A, which is the minimum possible welfare ratio and, therefore, optimal. We will analyze the
surplus welfare ratio of WMS auction. A useful definition for this analysis is that of downward closed
alternatives: A family of alternatives A is downward closed if, for all A ∈ A and for all B ⊂ A we
have B ∈ A. First, we show a negative result for non-downward closed alternatives.
Theorem 17. With non-downward closed alternatives,A can be constructed such that the WMS auction
has an arbitrarily large surplus welfare ratio.
Proof. We show that if the alternatives are not downward closed, then given a constant M ∈ R, a set
of alternatives may be constructed such that the surplus welfare ratio of the WMS auction is directly
proportional to M. That is, the surplus welfare ratio can be made arbitrarily large.
Let the feasible alternatives be A = {A, B} where A = {M, 1} and B = {3}. Without loss of generality,
the elements of the alternatives are the surplus si of the contained passengers. We see that wm(A) ≤ 2
regardless of M while wm(B) = 3. Therefore A∗ = B and Vs(A∗) = 3. However Vs(A) = M + 1, so we
have a surplus welfare ratio of M+13 . 
With that, we turn to the case of downward closed alternatives. This allows the WMS auction to obtain
a surplus welfare ratio of Hmax |A|, which is the harmonic number of the maximum cardinality found inA.
Note that this is only meaningful if a bound on max |A| can be given. In our ridesharing problem, the
size of the alternatives is bounded by the maximum capacity of each vehicle, for example, if cars with a
maximum capacity of 4 passengers are used, this would give a bound of H4 = 2512 ≈ 2.084.
Theorem 18. Given a downward closed family of alternativesA, the WMS auction has a surplus welfare
ratio of at most Hmax |A|.
Proof. Let A ∈ A be a feasible alternative. Also, let (1, . . . , i, . . . , |A|) be an ordering of the pas-
sengers in A such that bi ≥ bi+1 for i ≤ |A|. Let Bi be the alternative consisting of passen-
gers 1 to i. Since Bi ⊆ A and the alternatives are downward closed, we have Bi ∈ A. In the
WMS auction we have that wm(A∗) = maxA∈A{wm(A)}, thus, for all i, we obtain wm(Bi) ≤ wm(A∗)
and smin(Bi) ≤ wm(A∗)|Bi | . By construction, si = smin(Bi) and |Bi| = i so si ≤
wm(A∗)
i . The surplus welfare of
alternative A is defined as Vs(A) =
∑
i∈A si so we have obtained Vs(A) ≤ ∑|A|i=1 wm(A∗)i .Rewriting the right-
hand side as wm(A∗)
∑|A|
i=1
1
i , we find that the surplus welfare of A is bounded by Vs(A) ≤ wm(A∗)H|A|.
Loosening the bound we have Vs(A) ≤ wm(A∗)Hmax |A| for all A ∈ A. Noting the immediate fact
that |A|mini∈A si ≤ ∑i∈A si therefore wm(A) ≤ Vs(A) for any A and, in particular wm(A∗) ≤ Vs(A∗), we
may further loosen the inequality to Vs(A) ≤ Vs(A∗)Hmax |A| for all A ∈ A. It is now immediate that:
maxA∈A{Vs(A)}
Vs(A∗)
≤ Hmax |A|.
Therefore the surplus welfare ratio of the WMS auction is at most Hmax|A|. 
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 of Goel and Khani (2014), which was independently developed for
application in advertisement auctions, has a similarity with Theorem 18, also bounding the worst-case
welfare by a harmonic number in a scenario with downward closed alternatives.
We now show that the bound given in Theorem 18 on the surplus welfare ratio is tight.
Theorem 19. The bound on the surplus welfare ratio of Hmax |A| given in Theorem 18 is tight.
Proof. To prove that the bound is tight, we construct A such that the surplus welfare ratio is Hmax |A|.
Let B be a feasible alternative with an arbitrary |B| and wm(B), and let si = wm(B)i for the i-th passenger
in B. Let C be a feasible alternative such that |C| = |B| and si = wm(B)|C| for all i ∈ C. Assume that in a
tie-break C is preferred over any other alternative. Let A = P(B) ∪ P(C) where P(A) is power set of A,
that is, the set of all subsets, soA is downward closed.
We now show that A∗ = C. Since A∗ ∈ A, we have that A∗ ∈ P(B) ∪ P(C). All passengers in C have
the same si, so all C′ ∈ P(C) have the same smin(C′), but C has the greatest cardinality, so for C′ ∈ P(C)
the best alternative is C. This narrows the possible winners to A∗ ∈ P(B) ∪ {C}. For B′ ⊆ B, we
have that smin(B′) ≤ wm(B)|B′ | so wm(B′) ≤ wm(B). But wm(C) = wm(B) and C wins any tie-break, there-
fore A∗ = C.
If A′ ∈ P(A), then we have that Vs(A′) ≤ Vs(A). Thus maxA∈A{Vs(A)} must be Vs(B) or Vs(C). Not-
ing that Vs(B) = wm(B)H|B| and that Vs(C) = wm(B), we have maxA∈A{Vs(A)} = Vs(B). Combining the
equations maxA∈A{Vs(A)} = Vs(C)H|B| , maxA∈A{|A|} = |B|, and A∗ = C, we see that
maxA∈A{Vs(A)}
Vs(A∗)
= Hmax |A|.
Therefore, the bound is tight. 
Theorem 18 has downward closed alternatives as a condition, so we may ask whether that condi-
tion applies to the ridesharing problem. An instance of the ridesharing problem may not be downward
closed due to the restriction that all alternatives A ∈ A are feasible with ∑i∈A ci ≥ cost(A). For example
let A = {1} and B = {1, 2} with c1 = 1 and c2 = 2. Then cost(A) = 2 so A is not feasible and A < A,
but since cost(B) = 3 then c1 + c2 ≥ cost(B) so B ∈ A therefore A is not downward closed. Therefore
Theorem 18 does not necessarily apply to all ridesharing instances.
6.2. Lower bound on the surplus profit
Analogous to the surplus welfare, we can define the surplus profit as profits(A
∗) =
∑
i∈A∗(pi − ci). Re-
calling that the total profit is profit(A∗) =
∑
i∈A∗ pi − cost(A∗) and that ∑i∈A∗ ci ≥ cost(A∗) we have
that profits(A
∗) ≤ profit(A∗). Thus, the surplus profit is a lower bound to the total profit. Under certain
assumptions, we show that the surplus profit of the Weighted Minimum Surplus auction is guaranteed to
be at least 1maxA∈A{|A|} of the obtained surplus welfare.
Theorem 20. Assume that |A∗| ≥ 2 and that for all i ∈ A∗ it is true that A∗ \ {i} ∈ A. Then, in the WMS
auction, profits(A
∗) ≥ Vs(A∗)maxA∈A{|A|} .
Proof. By the definitions of profits(A
∗) and pi, we have that, profits(A∗) =
∑
i∈A∗
wm∗−i
|A′i | in the
WMS auction. As |A∗| ≥ 2, we know that A∗ \ {i} is not empty and, since A∗ \ {i} ⊂ A∗, we
have smin(A∗ \ {i}) ≥ smin(A∗). By hypothesis, A∗ \ {i} ∈ A and, thus, wm∗−i ≥ (|A∗| − 1)smin(A∗) for
all i ∈ A∗. Substituting into the definition of surplus profit, we have
profits(A
∗) ≥
∑
i∈A∗
(|A∗| − 1)smin(A∗)
|A′i |
.
Considering that the worst case for the right side is when |A∗| = 2 and |A′i | = maxA∈A{|A|}, we obtain
profits(A
∗) ≥
∑
i∈A∗
smin(A∗)
maxA∈A{|A|} ,
and, finally, we conclude that profits(A
∗) ≥ Vs(A∗)maxA∈A{|A|} from the definition of surplus welfare. 
Combining Theorem 18 and 20, we obtain Theorem 21 as an immediate consequence.
Theorem 21. IfA is downward closed and |A∗| ≥ 2 then
profits(A
∗) ≥ maxA∈A{Vs(A)}
Hmax |A|maxA∈A{|A|} .
Proof. If A is downward closed and |A∗| ≥ 2 then Theorem 18 and 20 both apply and the result is
immediate. 
It is a remarkable result to achieve a bound on how much of the surplus welfare is converted to surplus
profit by the auction, considering that the VCG auction maximizes welfare but may obtain little or no
profit (Ausubel et al., 2006). For other auctions that achieve a lower bound on the welfare and profit, see
the work on competitive auctions for digital goods by Goldberg et al. (2006).
7. An exact algorithm for the WMS auction
In this section, we present an exact algorithm based on integer linear programming (ILP) to solve the
WMS auction. Solving this problem requires finding solutions to a vehicle routing problem with pick-
up and drop-off locations and a vehicle capacity constraint. There is extensive literature on using linear
integer programming to solve vehicle routing problems exactly (Golden et al., 2008) and our formulation
of the constraints is based on the one presented for the Dial-A-Ride Problem (DARP) by Cordeau (2006),
simplified for a single driver.
7.1. Instance model
First, we define our model for the input instance. Each instance is a complete graph in which pick-up
nodes belong to the set P = {1, ..., n} and the drop-off nodes to the set D = {n + 1, ..., 2n}, where n is the
number of passengers. The surplus and cost of passenger i are non-negative constants si and ci, respec-
tively. The driver’s current location is the node 0 and, in a ridesharing scenario, the driver’s destination
is the node 2n + 1. Therefore the set of all nodes in the graph is N = P ∪ D ∪ {0, 2n + 1}. The maximum
capacity of passengers in the vehicle is Q and the change in the number of passengers in the vehicle
when visiting node i is qi such that if i ∈ P then qi = 1, if i ∈ D then qi = −1, and if i ∈ {0, 2n + 1}
then qi = 0. For the driver to go from node i to node j, therefore crossing the edge (i, j) it takes ti j time
and costs ci j. The maximum pick-up time and travel time of passenger i are, respectively, ki and li and,
in a ridesharing scenario, the driver’s maximum arrival time is T .
7.2. ILP model
We start describing the ILP model by its variables, whose values will be set to optimize the objective
function. Each edge (i, j) has an associated binary variable xi j ∈ {0, 1}which indicates if the edge belongs
to the trip. The real and non-negative variable Bi is the instant in which the driver visits the node i. The
integer and non-negative variable Qi is the number of passengers in the vehicle after visiting node i.
The objective function is to maximize m · smin where smin is a real and non-negative variable repre-
senting the minimum surplus of the trip and m is an integer and non-negative variable representing the
number of passengers in the trip. A non-linear, but direct formulation, is:
maximize m · smin (7)
subject to
∑
j∈N
x0 j = 1 (8)∑
i∈N
xi,2n+1 = 1 (9)∑
j∈N
x ji =
∑
j∈N
xi j ∀i ∈ P ∪ D (10)∑
j∈N
xi j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ P ∪ D (11)
m =
∑
j∈N
xi j ∀i ∈ P (12)
smin ≤ si + M
1 −∑
j∈N
xi j
 ∀i ∈ P (13)∑
j∈N
xi j =
∑
j∈N
xi+n, j ∀i ∈ P (14)
(Bi + ti j)xi j ≤ B j ≤ T ∀i, j ∈ N (15)
Bi ≤ ki ∀i ∈ P (16)
0 ≤ Bn+i − Bi ≤ li ∀i ∈ P (17)
(Qi + q j)xi j ≤ Q j ≤ Q ∀i, j ∈ P ∪ D (18)∑
i, j∈N
ci jxi j − c0,2n+1 ≤
∑
i∈P
ci∑
j∈N
xi j
 (19)
xi j ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ N (20)
Bi,Qi ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ N (21)
smin ∈ R+ (22)
m ∈ Z+ (23)
Constraints (8), (9), (10) and (11) are flow constraints which ensure that the variables xi j of value 1
define a simple path starting at the driver’s current location and ending at the driver’s destination. No cy-
cles are formed as otherwise constraint (15) would make arrival times go to infinity. Constraint (12) fixes
the number of passengers in the trip at m. In constraint (13), the value M is a sufficiently large constant,
specifically the largest bid of all passengers can be used. This constraint limits the variable smin, which is
maximized in the objective, to the minimum surplus of a served passenger. The constraint (14) guaran-
tees that passenger is picked up if and only if they are dropped off. Constraints in (15) set the arrival times
at each node and bounds them by the driver’s maximum arrival time. The time constraints in (17) ensure
that passengers are picked up before being dropped off and that maximum travel times are respected,
while constraint (16) enforces maximum pick-up times. The capacity constraints in (18) set the number
of passengers in the vehicle at each node and ensure that the maximum capacity is respected. Note that
the quadratic inequalities in (15) and (18) may be linearized respectively as Bi + ti j − M′(1 − xi j) ≤ B j
and Qi + q j − M′(1 − xi j) ≤ Q j, where M′ is a sufficiently large constant.
Constraint (19) conditions that cost(A∗) ≤ ∑i∈A∗ ci, where cost(A) is defined as the detour cost (the
total cost of the route minus the direct distance to the driver’s destination). This models a ridesharing
scenario as is used in our experiments, but ridesourcing can also be modeled by defining cost(A) simply
as the total cost of the route. We can generally use any other definition of cost that can be formulated as
a linear expression. This constraint and the non-negativity of si ensure that all solutions of the model are
feasible alternatives.
Finally, constraints (20), (21), (22) and (23) are variable domain contraints.
7.3. Linearizations of the objective function
The objective function is quadratic as written. We propose two methods to linearize it. The first is to
introduce a variable zi for each passenger i, with the following objective function and added constraints:
maximize
∑
i∈P
zi
zi ≤ si
∑
j∈N
xi j ∀i ∈ P
zi ≤ s j + (1 −
∑
k∈N
x jk)si ∀i, j ∈ P
This formulation is still subject to the constraints (8), (9), (10), (11), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18),
(19), (20), and (21), but not to constraints (12), (13), (22) and (23). Let A be the set of passengers in
a solution. This formulation ensures that for i ∈ A, we have zi = min j∈A s j and, if i < A, then zi = 0.
Therefore max
∑
i∈P zi = m · smin and the linear formulation is equivalent to the original quadratic one.
The variables m and smin are no longer present in the model but their values can be determined from a
solution to this linear formulation.
The second method to linearize the objective is to turn m into a constant and solve the model for
each value of m. First, it is necessary to limit the possible values for m, which is possible by removing
constraint (19) which requires the driver’s cost to be paid. Then the model gains the property of being
feasible for m + 1 passengers only if it is also feasible for m since removing any passenger from the
larger trip gives a smaller feasible solution. Therefore the model is only feasible for 1 ≤ m ≤ K for some
constant K. To find K for a given instance the ILP model must be checked for feasibility with constraint
(19) removed, starting at m = 1 and then for each consecutive value of m until the model becomes
infeasible at m = K + 1. Setting a limit to K, and therefore to the maximum trip size (for example,
allowing the driver to serve up to three passengers), can be a good heuristic to improve performance
while maintaining the properties of the auction.
Having determined K, the full ILP model must be optimized for each value of m, and A∗ is set as the
best solution found among all iterations. Note that the model does not guarantee that the route found will
have an optimal cost. To determine the optimal route it must be re-optimized with the passengers fixed
and route cost minimization as the objective.
To find wm∗−i the model must be optimized again for each m with an added constraint that the trip must
contain at least one passenger i whose price has not been determined yet. Having wm∗−i, it is possible to
determine A′i by constraining the objective to be at least wm
∗
−i and then maximizing for the number of
passengers in the trip. Having both wm∗−i and A
′
i the price pi may be calculated. Once pi is determined
for all i ∈ A∗, the algorithm is finished. Appropriate constraints should be added between optimizations
so that solutions are not repeated and solutions found in previous optimizations should be reused if still
relevant.
Since ridesharing problems involve passenger cars of low capacity and therefore a low K, this second
method showed a better empirical performance and was the one used in the experiments of the following
section.
8. Computational experiments
We have proposed two budget-balanced auctions for ridesharing: WMS and VCGs. In Section 4.1, we
proposed two ways of determining the cost ci of a passenger: The direct cost or upper bound cost. We
run computational experiments to gain empirical insight into the possible auction variants. We add to
this comparison two non-budget-balanced auctions, the standard social welfare maximizing VCG and
the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) with ci = 0 (Zero Cost) for all i and no feasible alternative
restriction. Table 2 presents all tested auctions.
Table 2: Auctions by type and cost.
Auction
Cost VCG Minimum Surplus
Upper Bound VCGs-UB WMS-UB
Direct Cost VCGs-Direct WMS-Direct
Zero Cost VCG WMS-Zero
The input instances are generated by uniformly distributing pick-up and delivery locations on a rectan-
gular section with about 100 square kilometers of area, centered on the city of Sa˜o Paulo. This real-world
map was obtained from the Open Street Map (OpenStreetMap contributors, 2017) database1. The time
and distances between locations are calculated using the OSRM (Luxen and Vetter, 2011) library. The
time constraints are such that a passenger i is willing to be picked up for 15 minutes after the driver’s
departure time t0, so ki = t0 + 15, and is willing to travel for at most twice the time ti,i+n taken in a
direct route, thus li = 2ti,i+n. The capacity of the vehicle is fixed at Q = 3. Bids are calculated as a
half-gaussian of the direct distance as in Kamar and Horvitz (2009) such that bi ≥ ci, with the standard
deviation σ varying between instance sets. The ILP models were solved using the GUROBI 9 solver, on
a Ryzen 5 3600X CPU.
Tables A1-A6 (in the Appendix) show the numerical results obtained for key metrics. Each table
corresponds to a combination of the total number of passengers in the instances and chosen σ for the
bid distribution. For each combination of these parameters, 100 instances were generated and executed.
There is one row per auction, and the values of each metric are the mean ± the standard deviation
over all instances. Before being averaged, the values of the profit and welfare metrics were normalized
by the welfare of the winning alternative in the standard VCG auction. The run time is measured in
whole seconds, therefore instances solved in under a second do not account for any run time. The run
time corresponds to the time taken by the second algorithm described in Section 7.3, which involves
optimizing the ILP model multiple times. The best means in each metric among the budget-balanced
variants are highlighted in bold.
8.1. Interpretation of results
Comparing the profit of VCG variants and WMS variants, we can see that WMS variants did slightly
better on the 10 passenger instances while the VCG variants did slightly better on the larger instance sets.
But without exception, when comparing for the same number of passengers, the same σ and the same
cost variant, the means of the VCG variants were always within half a standard deviation of the WMS
variant, and vice-versa. Therefore we can claim that VCG and WMS variants had equivalent results of
profit in this experiment.
1Map data copyrighted by OpenStreetMap contributors and available from www.openstreetmap.org.
Interpreting the welfare results of VCG and WMS, the VCG variants always obtained a mean wel-
fare over 88% of the maximum possible welfare. On the instance sets of 50 and 100 passengers the
VCGs-Direct and VCGs-UB variants even obtained a mean that is indistinguishable from the theoreti-
cal maximum, which is impressive considering that the budget-balanced variants have no guarantee of
maximizing social welfare. The WMS auctions obtained lower welfare than the VCG ones, which is
expected since WMS does not directly optimize for welfare, but still it had a mean welfare over 90%
of the maximum on all instance sets larger than 10 passengers. We can see that all budget-balanced
auctions obtained a high proportion of the maximum welfare, even without the theoretical guarantee of
maximizing social welfare.
For the passengers metric, which is the number of served passengers, the VCG variants consistently
obtained a higher mean than the WMS ones. This is because adding more passengers can increase wel-
fare, consequently improving the VCG objective function. However, in WMS auctions adding a passen-
ger with a low bid may reduce the value of the WMS objective function.
Observing the run time, we see that 10 passenger instances were all processed in under 1 second,
while the 25 passenger instances had mean run times under 4 seconds. Thus, for these instance sizes
the exact algorithm proved to be viable for solving instances in real-time. For the 50 and 100 passenger
instance sizes, we see run times that make our exact algorithm unsuitable for real-time use cases. Com-
paring among auction types, the WMS variants have a mean run time that is consistently higher than the
corresponding VCG variant.
The instance sets of 10 and 25 passengers were run with σ = 3 and σ = 5, so we can measure the
effect of different standard deviation values for the half-gaussian distribution of bids. We see that for
both instances sizes for all auctions, the instance set with σ = 5 achieved a better or equal value of profit
and welfare, so all auctions were able to take advantage of the higher bids.
We can also observe the results of the different cost functions. It is important to note that the non-
budget-balanced auctions VCG and WMS-Zero did incur a loss in some instances, so the budget-
balanced property has practical consequences. Looking at the profit, it is interesting to notice that, in
the 10 passenger instances, the direct cost performed worse than the zero cost. In instances with more
passengers, these two cost types had similar performance. In these experiments, the upper bound cost
always had a higher mean profit than the other two cost functions. By setting a higher fixed cost it was
able to charge higher prices from the passengers with higher bids. We also noticed that a higher cost
function had as a consequence a lower mean runtime, with the zero cost being the slowest and the upper
bound the fastest, this can be explained by higher costs filtering out more passengers whose bid is lower
than their cost.
The parameter changes that most significantly increased the profit and welfare were a higher number
of passengers and a higher σ for the bid distribution. We analyze normalized values, so we may claim
that all these auctions are more efficient in obtaining a higher ratio of the maximum achievable profit and
welfare when there are more passengers in the instance. This is in line with other experimental results in
the literature such as Kamar and Horvitz (2009) and Kleiner et al. (2011), whose systems were also more
efficient with a higher number of passengers. The choice of cost function also had a significant effect, so
the cost function should be tailored to the situation in which the auction is being applied. Surprisingly,
the choice between a VCGs or WMS auction was the least impactful one. All other things being equal
the VCGs and WMS variants had very similar performance.
9. Conclusion and future research
This paper analyzed the theoretical and empirical properties of two newly proposed budget-balanced
auctions for ridesharing problems, the VCGs auction and the WMS auction, which can be combined with
any cost function that fulfills certain requirements. We proved the strategy-proof and budget-balanced
properties of these auctions. The experimental results, which utilized randomly generated instances on a
real map, showed equivalence between the WMS auction and the VCG auction in the welfare and profit
metrics. However, the WMS auction offers interesting theoretical results with the lower bounds for the
surplus welfare and surplus profit which we proved in Theorems 18, 20 and 21, under the downward
closed alternatives assumption.
The WMS auction can be applied not only to ridesharing, but to any single-parameter domain in which
individual bidders form groups, analogous to the trips in ridesharing, and there are complex restrictions
on what groups are allowed to be formed. Applying the WMS auction to problems outside ridesharing is
a possibility for future research, particularly problems with downward closed alternatives. Generalizing
the WMS auction for multiple drivers is another area of future work.
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Summary of the computational experiments
Table A1: 10 passengers, σ = 3
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welfare Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.51 ± 0.28 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.51 ± 0.28 1.81 ± 0.46 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-Zero 0.56 ± 0.21 0.92 ± 0.11 0.92 ± 0.11 0.56 ± 0.21 1.45 ± 0.5 0.0 ± 0.0
VCGs-Direct 0.34 ± 0.29 0.88 ± 0.3 0.84 ± 0.29 0.3 ± 0.28 1.72 ± 0.67 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-Direct 0.37 ± 0.26 0.81 ± 0.29 0.77 ± 0.28 0.33 ± 0.25 1.41 ± 0.64 0.0 ± 0.0
VCGs-UB 0.59 ± 0.22 0.97 ± 0.08 0.77 ± 0.08 0.39 ± 0.23 1.67 ± 0.51 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-UB 0.58 ± 0.2 0.86 ± 0.15 0.71 ± 0.12 0.43 ± 0.19 1.27 ± 0.45 0.0 ± 0.0
Table A2: 10 passengers, σ = 5
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welf. Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.53 ± 0.28 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.53 ± 0.28 1.86 ± 0.47 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-Zero 0.58 ± 0.2 0.94 ± 0.1 0.94 ± 0.1 0.58 ± 0.2 1.53 ± 0.54 0.0 ± 0.0
VCGs-Direct 0.38 ± 0.29 0.9 ± 0.28 0.86 ± 0.27 0.34 ± 0.29 1.73 ± 0.66 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-Direct 0.41 ± 0.27 0.84 ± 0.29 0.8 ± 0.28 0.37 ± 0.26 1.45 ± 0.64 0.0 ± 0.0
VCGs-UB 0.6 ± 0.23 0.99 ± 0.03 0.8 ± 0.06 0.42 ± 0.24 1.76 ± 0.51 0.0 ± 0.0
WMS-UB 0.63 ± 0.18 0.91 ± 0.12 0.75 ± 0.11 0.47 ± 0.17 1.45 ± 0.52 0.0 ± 0.0
Table A3: 25 passengers, σ = 3
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welf. Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.67 ± 0.19 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.67 ± 0.19 2.11 ± 0.31 2.72 ± 2.17
WMS-Zero 0.66 ± 0.17 0.94 ± 0.1 0.94 ± 0.1 0.66 ± 0.17 1.82 ± 0.41 3.86 ± 3.53
VCGs-Direct 0.67 ± 0.21 0.98 ± 0.1 0.93 ± 0.1 0.62 ± 0.21 2.08 ± 0.34 2.13 ± 2.0
WMS-Direct 0.65 ± 0.19 0.92 ± 0.14 0.88 ± 0.13 0.61 ± 0.18 1.83 ± 0.4 3.02 ± 3.17
VCGs-UB 0.72 ± 0.17 0.99 ± 0.03 0.79 ± 0.04 0.52 ± 0.17 2.0 ± 0.35 0.68 ± 1.25
WMS-UB 0.69 ± 0.16 0.91 ± 0.13 0.74 ± 0.1 0.52 ± 0.14 1.7 ± 0.46 1.11 ± 1.71
Table A4: 25 passengers, σ = 5
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welfare Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.69 ± 0.17 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.69 ± 0.17 2.09 ± 0.32 2.82 ± 2.2
WMS-Zero 0.68 ± 0.15 0.96 ± 0.09 0.96 ± 0.09 0.68 ± 0.15 1.88 ± 0.36 3.59 ± 3.28
VCGs-Direct 0.68 ± 0.19 0.99 ± 0.1 0.94 ± 0.1 0.64 ± 0.18 2.05 ± 0.33 2.37 ± 2.38
WMS-Direct 0.68 ± 0.19 0.94 ± 0.14 0.9 ± 0.13 0.63 ± 0.18 1.87 ± 0.37 3.45 ± 3.08
VCGs-UB 0.73 ± 0.14 0.99 ± 0.03 0.81 ± 0.03 0.54 ± 0.14 2.03 ± 0.33 1.5 ± 1.83
WMS-UB 0.73 ± 0.12 0.95 ± 0.1 0.78 ± 0.08 0.56 ± 0.11 1.83 ± 0.4 2.09 ± 2.4
Table A5: 50 passengers, σ = 3
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welfare Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.78 ± 0.15 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.78 ± 0.15 2.29 ± 0.46 58.93 ± 64.53
WMS-Zero 0.75 ± 0.1 0.95 ± 0.07 0.95 ± 0.07 0.75 ± 0.1 1.98 ± 0.2 104.2 ± 109.94
VCGs-Direct 0.79 ± 0.13 1.0 ± 0.01 0.95 ± 0.02 0.74 ± 0.14 2.29 ± 0.46 55.31 ± 55.21
WMS-Direct 0.76 ± 0.11 0.95 ± 0.07 0.9 ± 0.07 0.72 ± 0.11 2.0 ± 0.2 70.53 ± 70.7
VCGs-UB 0.8 ± 0.11 1.0 ± 0.01 0.81 ± 0.03 0.61 ± 0.12 2.23 ± 0.42 23.28 ± 22.83
WMS-UB 0.78 ± 0.11 0.95 ± 0.08 0.77 ± 0.07 0.6 ± 0.1 1.94 ± 0.28 32.29 ± 33.67
Table A6: 100 passengers, σ = 3
Auction Profit Welfare Surplus Welfare Surplus Profit Passengers Time (s)
VCG 0.82 ± 0.12 1.0 ± 0.0 1.0 ± 0.0 0.82 ± 0.12 2.52 ± 0.5 923.41 ± 827.46
WMS-Zero 0.79 ± 0.08 0.95 ± 0.05 0.95 ± 0.05 0.79 ± 0.08 2.0 ± 0.14 3959.5 ± 6353.58
VCGs-Direct 0.82 ± 0.11 1.0 ± 0.0 0.95 ± 0.01 0.77 ± 0.11 2.52 ± 0.5 1186.15 ± 1144.35
WMS-Direct 0.8 ± 0.08 0.95 ± 0.05 0.9 ± 0.05 0.75 ± 0.08 2.0 ± 0.14 3117.53 ± 5898.95
VCGs-UB 0.84 ± 0.09 1.0 ± 0.01 0.81 ± 0.02 0.65 ± 0.1 2.44 ± 0.5 493.52 ± 464.65
WMS-UB 0.81 ± 0.08 0.95 ± 0.06 0.78 ± 0.05 0.64 ± 0.07 2.0 ± 0.14 1276.05 ± 2517.95
